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This paper reviews the literature on political Islam, political institutions and civil society 
in Iran, as well as the evolution of Iran’s relationship with Iraq since 2003.  The review 
begins with an overview of the literature on Iran’s post-revolution political system, and 
political Islam in Iran from 1979 to 2007.  It proceeds to examine the literature on 
political parties and factionalism in Iran; women’s political participation; the role of civil 
society in contemporary Iran; and the social agenda and policy influence of Iran’s 
parastatal foundations (bonyads).  The review also explores the literature on the evolution 
and character of key movements in Iranian politics, including reformism and 
conservatism.  The final sections examine the Iran-Iraq relationship, and identify 
potential directions for future research. 
 
This review focuses on the research available in English, much of which is produced by 
members of the Iranian diaspora.  It would undoubtedly be enriched by a complementary 
examination of the substantial body of Farsi literature on these subjects.  This review was 
carried out for IDRC’s Middle East Good Governance (MEGG) Fund, as a contribution 
to the Fund’s efforts to support the development of a solid collection of research on 
political Islam, political parties and civil society in the Middle East.  This review aims to 
enhance the comparative aspect of the research supported by the MEGG Fund, but as a 
non-Arab, predominantly Shi’a country, Iran differs considerably from the majority of 
other countries in the region.  While countries such as Egypt and Lebanon are ruled by 
secular regimes grappling with Islamist groups, the post-revolutionary Iranian state is 
constitutionally defined as an Islamist entity, founded on the doctrine of velayat-e faqih 
(rule of the Islamic jurist). 
 
Contemporary Iran illustrates the potential benefits, challenges and tensions involved in 
the incorporation of political Islam into the core of the state.  The literature confirms that 
an impressively diverse array of Iranians identify themselves as Islamists, including 
members of the beleaguered reform movement.  Yet, many key players from the 1979 
revolution have grown disillusioned with the ideology of the revolution.  The experience 
of exercising political power has prompted many Iranian Islamists to question the 
velayat-e faqih, and rethink the relationship between Islam and democracy.  Indeed, 
much of the literature suggests that in comparison to many of its neighbours, Iran has 
already made significant progress in incorporating democratic principles into the 
country’s political fabric.  The Iranian case therefore provides a critical counterpoint for 
those concerned with the rise and evolution of political Islam in the Middle East, and the 
question of how the involvement of Islamist groups in mainstream politics affects their 
agendas. 
 
The literature emphasizes the complex nature of the Iranian political system; the diversity 
of the key actors and their views; and the importance of the tensions and rivalries that 
animate Iranian politics.  While much of the literature on political Islam in Iran depicts a 
struggle between the forces of “tradition” and “modernity”, a growing number of authors 




scholars highlight decidedly modern currents in Islamist debates from Khomeini to the 
present day. 
 
Contrary to simplistic media portrayals of the Iranian political landscape, the vast 
majority of the literature on contemporary Iranian politics underlines that neither 
reformism nor conservatism are monolithic movements.  Rather, each faction has various 
sub-groups, with actors’ allegiances shifting depending on the issue at hand.  Although 
the strength of Iranian civil society is a matter of debate, observers are virtually 
unanimous in recognizing the importance of intellectual and theological debate in Iranian 
politics.  As one author puts it, in “Iran, unlike most countries, epistemological debates 
have political implications.”1  While it is often assumed that Iranian women are on the 
margins of these debates, the literature examined in this review suggests that women’s 
rights are a central “battleground” in the fight for legitimacy and control in the Islamic 
Republic.  Women play diverse and active roles in this struggle, whether as MPs, 
grassroots organizers, scholars or soldiers. 
 
The Iranian reform movement is perhaps the most thoroughly studied aspect of 
contemporary Iranian politics.  The English literature on Iranian political movements 
focuses principally on the reformist camp, rather than on conservative movements and 
other trends.  However, the evolving relationship between reformism and conservatism is 
explored by numerous authors.  While there is heated discussion in the American media 
and literature on prompting regime change in Iran through military action or other forms 
of outside pressure, many if not most scholars seem to embrace the view that “[t]here is 
no question that working within the Islamic system is the best way to initiate reforms in 
Iran.”2  Indeed, many members of the reform movement identify themselves as Islamist. 
 
Most detailed studies of the reform movement were published during the Khatami 
presidency, when the reform movement was at its zenith.  Many of these studies reflect 
an optimism about the strength of the reform movement that has not proven to be entirely 
warranted, given the 2005 election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the virtual 
disintegration of the reform camp.  Many analyses completed since 2005 suggest that 
while the reform movement suffers from deep internal divisions, a lack of clear vision, 
and a seeming inability to respond to voters’ socio-economic concerns, it would be 
premature to conclude that reformism is entirely defunct. 
 
Issues for future research 
 
There is clearly a wealth of literature on the experience of political Islam in Iran, but 
producing comprehensive recommendations on areas for future research would require a 
thorough examination of the Farsi literature, as well as in-depth discussions with 
researchers working in Iran.  Given the profoundly restrictive political climate in Iran at 
the moment, this is no simple proposition.  However, it is clear from the literature that 
understanding Iran’s encounters with political Islam is essential to appreciating the 
                                                 
1 Kurzman, C. (2001) “Critics within: Islamic scholars’ protests against the Islamic state in Iran”, 
International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 16 (1), p. 341, 357. 




broader trajectory of political Islam in the Middle East.  Yet there is only a limited 
amount of recent literature that engages in rigorous comparative analysis of Islamism in 
Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East.  Despite the challenges associated with carrying 
out comparative studies on Iran, focused comparative research could yield insightful 
results of clear interest to both scholars and political actors. 
 
Many prominent interpretations of contemporary political events in Iran are not based on 
rigorous analysis, and several scholars identify specific issues within the broad topic of 
political Islam and Iranian politics that merit future research.  Key questions that have 
attracted relatively little scholarly attention include: “How and under what circumstances 
have domestic changes occurred during the past two decades under the rule of the Islamic 
state in Iran?  To what extent have the revolutionary political culture and the legacy of 
Khomeini…continued or changed?  When and how have domestic and international 
politics interacted in post-revolutionary Iran?”3  Arguments about the social significance 
of popular or grassroots reform movements require further substantiation.  Similarly, 
despite the unquestionable political importance of young Iranians, there is a lack of solid 
studies on this generation’s views and political activities.  Scholars have also highlighted 
the need for more research on the operations and influence of the bonayds; the evolving 
views and strategies of Iranian Islamist feminists; and significance of the transformation 
of the public and private spheres in Iran, given the implementation of Islamist policies in 
Iran.  While various analysts suggest that Iran functions as a quasi-hegemon in the region, 
analyses of Iran’s influence in Iraq are rife with assumptions that could be beneficially 
substantiated or refuted with more rigorous research.  Each of these lines of inquiry pose 
serious practical challenges, but could make valuable contributions to policy as well as to 
the state of research on political Islam in Iran and internationally. 
                                                 
3 Vaez, H. (2004) “Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Continuity and Change”, British Journal of Middle 






One of the most popular images to describe the political situation in Iran is a crossroads.4  
Domestically, Iran stands at a crossroads between modernity and tradition, reform and 
conservatism, and democratization and political repression.  Internationally, Iran finds 
itself at a crossroads in terms of its nuclear policy, and its relationship with its neighbour 
and historical nemesis, Iraq.  Despite sharp limits on academic freedom in Iran, many 
researchers in Iran, the Middle East and further afield are working to understand the 
political and religious views and the socio-economic conditions that have brought Iran to 
so many critical junctures. 
 
This paper reviews the literature on political Islam, political institutions and civil society 
in Iran, as well as the evolution of Iran’s relationship with Iraq since 2003.  The review 
begins with an overview of the literature on Iran’s post-revolution political system, and 
political Islam in Iran from 1979 to 2007.  It proceeds to examine the literature on 
political parties and factionalism in Iran; women’s political participation; the role of civil 
society in contemporary Iran; and the social agenda and policy influence Iran’s parastatal 
foundations.  The review also explores the literature on the evolution and character of key 
Iranian political movements, including reformism and conservatism.  The final sections 
examine the Iran-Iraq relationship, and identify potential directions for future research.5
  
It is important to note that this review focuses on the research available in English, much 
of which is produced by members of the Iranian diaspora.  The review would 
undoubtedly be enriched by a complementary examination of the substantial body of 
Farsi literature on these subjects.  This would bring to light more of the research 
produced by Iranians working in Iran. 
 
This review was carried out for IDRC’s Middle East Good Governance (MEGG) Fund, 
as a contribution to the Fund’s efforts to support the development of a solid collection of 
research on political Islam, political parties and civil society in the Middle East.  This 
review aims to enhance the comparative aspect of the research supported by the MEGG 
Fund, but it is important to note that the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran differs 
considerably from the majority of other countries in the region.  Iran is one of the few 
countries in the world where Shi’a Muslims are in the majority.  Unlike its Middle 
Eastern neighbours, Iran is predominantly ethnically Persian (51%) and Azeri (24%) 
rather than Arab.6  While countries such as Egypt and Lebanon are ruled by secular 
regimes grappling with Islamist groups, the post-revolutionary Iranian state is 
constitutionally defined as an Islamist entity, founded on the doctrine of velayat-e faqih 
(rule of the Islamic jurist).  Contemporary Iran illustrates the potential benefits, 
                                                 
4 See for example Esposito, J., and Ramazani, R. (eds.) (2001) Iran at the Crossroads (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan). 
5 A significant percentage of the English literature on Iranian politics and political Islam focuses on Iranian-
American relations and Iran’s nuclear program, and appears to be undertaken largely by researchers 
working in Europe and the United States.  This literature review does not focus on Iran’s nuclear policy or 
its relationship with the United States, but acknowledges the influence of these issues on the study and 
practice of Iranian politics. 




challenges and tensions involved in the incorporation of political Islam into the core of 
the state.  The literature confirms that an impressively diverse array of Iranians identify 
themselves as Islamists, including members of the beleaguered reform movement.  Yet, 
many key players from the 1979 revolution have grown disillusioned with the ideology of 
the revolution.  At the same time, processes of technological modernization and 
westernization touch virtually every corner of the country.  The Iranian case therefore 
provides an interesting counterpoint for those concerned with the rise and evolution of 
political Islam in the Middle East, and the question of how the involvement of Islamist 
groups in mainstream politics affects their agendas. 
 
A brief sketch of Iranian history, demographics and socio-economic conditions 
 
Before proceeding with the review, a brief sketch of Iran’s history, demographics and 
socio-economic conditions is in order.  Although Iran was never formally colonialized, 
colonial powers exerted considerable influence in Iran in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, while the country was ruled by the Qajar dynasty.  The Persian Constitutional 
Revolution took place from 1905-1921, and in a 1921 coup Reza Shah Pahlavi seized 
power from the enfeebled Qajar rulers.  The UK and USSR invaded Iran during World 
War II and forced the Shah to cede power to his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.  In 1951, 
nationalist politician Mohammed Mossadegh was elected Iran’s first Prime Minister, and 
nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (BP), which controlled Iran’s vast reserves.  
With the UK’s prompting, the CIA orchestrated a coup against Mossadegh, and reinstated 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as Shah in 1953. 
 
Under the Shah’s leadership, Iran was the United States’ foremost ally in the Middle 
East, and implemented a series of pro-western policies aimed at social and economic 
“modernization”.  Yet the Shah’s regime practiced extreme political repression, 
imprisoning numerable critics including Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who went 
into exile following his release from prison in 1964.  A movement for change gained 
momentum amongst an ecclectic collection of actors, including secularists, Marxists and 
political Islamists.  This movement drove the Shah from power in 1979, after which 
Khomeini returned to Iran and consolidated his standing as the figurehead of the 
revolution.  Khomeini instituted his doctrine of velayat-e faqih, which was anchored in 
the new Constitution in 1979, following a national referendum.  After establishing new 
structures of Islamic government, Khomeini suppressed the opposition raised by some 
former revolutionary supporters, and drove women, secularists and liberals from 
prominent public positions, particularly in the universities and judiciary. 
 
The US decision to extend asylum to the Shah inflamed relations between Washington 
and Tehran, and US-Iranian relations deteriorated dramatically due to the November 
1979-January 1981 US Embassy Hostage Crisis.  The brutal Iran-Iraq war began in 1980 
and raged until 1988.  Grand Ayatollah Khomeini died in June 1989, and was replaced by 
Ali Khamenei, the former President and a relatively junior cleric.  Under Supreme Leader 
Khamenei and Presidents Rafsanjani (1989-1997), Khatami (1997-2005) and 
Ahmadinejad (2005-present), Iran has emerged as a regional hegemon, but has been 





Iran has a population of 68.6 million, made up of ethnic Persians (51%) and Azeris 
(24%), with notable minority populations of Gilakis and Mazandaranis (8%) and Kurds 
(7%).  89% are Shi’a Muslims, while 9% are Sunnis.  2% of the population come from 
Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian or Bahai backgrounds.7  The reform of Iranian family 
planning policies in the late 1980s led to the stabilization of the Iranian population 
growth rate at 1.1%, yet the denial of access to family planning options in the first decade 
after the revolution has resulted in a population that is one of the youngest in the world.  
70% of the overall population and 50% of the Iranian electorate is under the age of 30.8  
Between 1976 and 1991, literacy rates rose from 47% to 71%, and now stand at 79% 
(male 86%, female 73%).  However, unemployment rates are high, significant 
proportions of the population underemployed, and the country has one of the highest rates 
of  “brain drain” in the world.9
 
Iran’s political landscape is definitively shaped by its natural resources: Iran has the 
world’s second largest gas and third largest oil reserves.  Yet Iran’s plentiful natural 
resources have not translated into improved standards of living for the majority of the 
population.  In real terms, Iran’s average per capita income has fallen by a third since the 
revolution, while the standard of living has declined by 20 percent, with 40% of the 
population living below the poverty line.10  The oil industry is characterized by 
widespread corruption, and the country is forced to import energy because it lacks 
sufficient domestic refining capacity.  A widespread concern for young Iranians is the 
impossibility of earning the substantial amounts of money required to marry. Young 
Iranians have no cherished memories of the revolution, and often a much greater 
willingness than older generations to question the wisdom of a political system that has 
proven unable to meet their basic socio-economic needs. 
 
The Iranian political system 
 
Iran’s political system is notoriously complex.  Understanding the purpose and character 
of the country’s various political bodies requires an appreciation of both the theological 
underpinnings of the Islamic Republic, and the competing interests of these institutions 
and their leaders.  William Buchta’s 2000 text Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power 
in the Islamic Republic is widely regarded as one of the clearest and most penetrating 
                                                 
7 Eliz Sanasarian’s 2000 book Religious Minorities in Iran provides a well-researched discussion of the 
implications of Iran’s Islamist ideology for members of the country’s main non-Muslim religious 
minorities, the Armenians, Chaldenas, Assyrians, Zoroastrians, Jews, Bahais and converted Christians.  
Focusing primarily on the first decade of the Islamic Republic (1979-1989), Sanasarian engages two main 
questions: “(1) what has been the overall policy of the theocratic Islamic state toward its non-Muslim 
religious minorities? And (2), how have the minorities dealt with the state intrusion into their lives?”  
Sanasarian emphasizes the importance of learned cultural traditions in shaping the minorities’ responses to 
changing political circumstances, and concludes by raising broader questions about the “perils of 
marginality” in the Islamic Republic.  See Sanasarian, E. (2006) Religious Minorities in Iran (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), pp. xii-xiii. 
8 Campbell, D. (2006) “Iran’s Quiet Revolution”, The Walrus, September 2006, p. 58 
9 BBC (2007) “Huge cost of Iranian brain drain”, BBC News, 8 January 2007. 




explanations of Iran’s political structure.11  The International Crisis Group has also 
released a number of reports that provide succinct overviews of the Iranian political 
system and the affiliations of the key players.12  Although the “genesis, institutions, and 
political life [of the Islamic Republic] have been described in great detail,”13 few analyses 
“do justice to the relationships—blood as well as political—between many prominent 
Iranians, still less to the personal animosities that excite them.”14  Nikki Keddie’s updated 
text Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution provides a prescient analysis of the 
antecedents of the revolution, the political system it engendered, and recent challenges to 
this system.15
 
Major political institutions in Iran include the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian 
Council, the office of the President and the Iranian Parliament (majlis).  Each institution 
has a role in the conceptualization of Iran as an Islamic state, and the functions and 
limitations of these offices are set out in Iranian Constitution.  The Constitution 
recognizes that Islam is a comprehensive way of life, which serves as the basis of 
government, and rightfully regulates both worship and society.  It also enshrines both 
limited democratic principles and the doctrine of velayat-e faqih.  The theological and 
democratic principles set out in the Constitution often clash with one another, leading to 
conflict between Iran’s elected and unelected rulers.16  Schirazi’s oft-cited The 
Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic provides an exhaustive 
discussion of the Constitution and its political significance.  Prominent Iranian lawyer 
Mehrangiz Kar has also written on the Iranian Constitution, arguing that reform cannot be 
achieved in Iran without radical changes to the Constitution.17  In “Islam, Law, and 
Political Control in Contemporary Iran”, Tamadonfar further elaborates on the process of 
lawmaking in the Islamic Republic.  He suggests that by “emphasizing ‘communal 
interest’ in legislation and establishing an extensive institutional mechanism of legal 
control, the clerics gradually marginalized the shari’a and sacrificed the Islamic notion of 
universality of law for legal territoriality.”18  Tamadonfar suggests that this trend is 
divorcing the clerics from their traditional religious role, and undercutting their 
legitimacy.  Tamadonfar argues that the reformists’ legal and political reform program 
                                                 
11 Buchta, W. (2000) Who Rules Iran? the Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic (Washington, D.C.: 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy). 
12 See for example International Crisis Group (2002) Iran: The Struggle for the Revolution’s Soul (New 
York: International Crisis Group). 
13 Chehabi, H.E. (2001) “The Political Regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Comparative 
Perspective”, Government and Opposition 36, p. 48. 
14 Economist (2003) “The surreal world of Iranian politics”, Economist 366 (8307). 
15 Keddie, N. R. (2006) Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (updated edition) (New Haven: Yale 
University Press). 
16 Conservative commentators such Amir Mohebbiyan argue that there is no inherent conflict of principles 
in the Iranian system because the people in fact select the Supreme Leader, as they elect the members of the 
Assembly of Experts who identify the Supreme Leader.  However, critics respond that this argument is 
flawed as all the members of the Assembly of Experts must be clerics, who are approved by the Council of 
Guardians. 
17 Kar, M. (2003) “Constitutional Constraints”, Journal of Democracy 14 (1). 
18 Tamadonfar, M. (2001) “Islam, Law and Political Control in Contemporary Iran”, Journal for the 




would in fact benefit the clerical class by instituting a system more consistent with the 
shari’a. 
 
Numerous authors have written at length on the position of the Supreme Leader, focusing 
largely on the role and charismatic authority of the first Supreme Leader, and the 
implications of his death in 1989.19  For example, Daniel Brumberg argues that 
Khomeini’s revolutionary vision was “anything but straightforward, coherent, or 
consistent.”20  Rather, “Khomeini’s religiopolitical views swung from one perspective to 
another;…[and] during the last years of his life—and with nearly complete abandon after 
his death in June 1989—his followeres exploited these competing notions of authority to 
advance various agendas of their own.”21  Brumberg’s work also gives insight into 
Khomeini’s conception of both poltical Islam and political strategy, writing.  For 
example, Brumberg argues that “if [Khomeini]…radiated a spiritual logic that could not 
be reduced to a vulgar struggle for power or wealth, his quest to forge a new identity for 
his people was also animated by a rational approach to politics and religion.  Khomeini 
articulated a utilitarian instrumentalism that viewed religion as a useful tool for attaining 
collective political and social ends.”22  Many scholars concerned with Khomeini’s legacy 
underline the disparity between Khomeini’s impeccable theological qualifications, and 
the much lower clerical status of his successor, Khamenei, who was only elevated to the 
rank of Ayatollah when he was made Supreme Leader.  These observers stress that 
Khamenei’s lack of theolgoical qualifications brings the legitimacy of his leadership and 
the theocratic system into question. 
 
Turning to Iran’s elected institutions, Baktiari’s Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary 
Iran provides a useful introduction to the politics of the majlis and the importance of 
factionalism in the Iranian political system.23  Much of the literature on the reform 
movement contains detailed analyses of the political performance of former presidents 
Khatami and Rafsanjani, as well as discussions of the limitations Iran’s dual power 
system places on the president.  The International Crisis Group’s 2007 report Iran: 
Ahmadi-Nejad’s Tumultuous Presidency provides a sharp, contemporary analysis of the 
current president’s performance, and underlines the “continued ability of politics in Iran 
to swing the pendulum back, rein in policies deemed dangerous to regime survival and 
                                                 
19 See for example Halliday, F. (2000) “The contradictory legacies of Ayatollah Khomeini: The Iranian 
revolution at twenty”, in Tapper, R. (ed.) Ayatollah Khomeini and the modernization of Islamic thought 
(London: Centre for Near and Middle Eastern Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies).  See also 
Ehteshami, A. (1995) After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic (London: Routledge); and Mozaffari, 
M. (1993) “Changes in the Iranian Political System after Khomeini’s Death”, Political Science 41. 
20 Brumberg, D. (2001) Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press), p. ix. 
21 Brumberg 2001, p. ix.  See also Brumberg, D. (1997) “Khomeini's Legacy: Islamic Rule and Islamic 
Social Justice”, in Appleby, S. (ed.) Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders in the Middle 
East (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 
22 Brumberg 2001, p. 5. 





trigger change—arduous, slow and modest though it might be.”24  The ICG opines that 
more than anything else, the “president’s inability to deliver on his economic 
program…is contributing to his noticeable and steady decline in the public’s eyes.”25  
This is not to suggest that Ahmadinejad’s rule is tenuous, or that the international 
pressure can productively alter the course of Iranian politics. 
 
In addition to political institutions such as the majlis and the presidency, military and 
paramilitary institutions are also animated by Islamist principles, and exert considerable 
influence on the Iranian political landscape.  These institutions include the volunteer basij 
militia, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, which is discussed at length by Kenneth 
Katzman.26
 
Taking a broader perspective, Esposito and Ramazani’s edited collection Iran at the 
Crossroads offers a series of essays on pressing challenges including reform and 
resistance, evolving ideology, women’s rights and foreign policy, by prominent scholars 
such as Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Mohsen Milani and Fred Halliday.27  Scholar H.E. Chehabi 
has also produced influential analyses of the Iranian political system, suggesting that 
“[g]iven the explicitly non-democratic bent of the original Islamic republicans, their 
claim that theirs was an ideological state, and this ideology’s derivation from immutable 
and eternally valid God-given laws, one would expect their regime to be frankly 
totalitarian.”28  However, Chehabi argues that contemporary Iran’s political system does 
not fit the totalitarian model.  Chehabi’s work also engages with the difficulties 
associated with carrying out comparative analyses using the Islamic Republic as a case 
study.  Chehabi suggests that “[s]ince much of the top leadership of the Shi’ite religious 
establishment has stayed aloof from politics, Iran is not ruled by the clergy but by a 
politicized section of it”, a group he calls the “clerisy”.29
 
In “The Power Structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran”, Kazem Alamdari examines 
how the clergy and other competing, parallel groups sustain a clientelistic power structure 
in the Islamic Republic.  Alamdari argues that the clientelistic system “originated in three 
major sources—the Shi’a multiple hierarchy of power, the rentier state and numerous 
financially self-sufficient religious organizations formed after the 1979 revolution.”30  
Iran’s political structure “is not constructed like a canopy, in which removing the central 
pole causes its collapse; rather, it is built on many independent, rival, parallel columns of 
power that hold the system together.”31  Alamdari asserts that elected government has 
                                                 
24 International Crisis Group (2007) Iran: Ahmadi-Nejad’s Tumultuous Presidency (New York: 
International Crisis Group)., p. 25.  See also International Crisis Group (2005) Iran: What does Ahmadi-
Nejad's Victory Mean? (New York: International Crisis Group). 
25 International Crisis Group 2007, p. 25. 
26 See Katzman, K. (1993) The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard (Boulder: Westview Press). 
27 Esposito and Ramazani 2001. 
28 Chehabi 2001, p. 50. 
29 Chehabi 2001, p. 52.  See also Chebadi, H. E. (1991) “Religion and Politics in Iran: How Theocratic is 
the Islamic Republic?”, Daedalus 120. 
30 Alamdari, K. (2005) “The Power Structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Transition from Populism to 
Clientelism, and Militarization of the Government”, Third World Quarterly 26 (8), p. 1298. 




failed to end clientelism in Iran, and that it is unlikely to do so as long as non-elected 
leaders retain their powerful positions.  The clientelistic system will end, Alamdari 
argues, only with the strengthening of a class system in Iran. 
 
Similarly, Kamrava and Hassan-Yari argue that the Iranian political system involves two 
sets of power relations: official, constitutionally-sanctioned institutional relationships, 
and unofficial relations “existing between and within groups and clusters of powerful 
individuals and institutions.”  Kamrava and Hassan-Yari suggest that the juxtaposition of 
formal institutions and unofficial factional alliances has resulted in a precarious balance 
of power, with two main results: “On the one hand, the emergence of multiple centres of 
power has enhanced the extent and reach of the state in relation to various social strata, 
thus bestowing it with considerable durability and staying power.  On the other hand, the 
existence of multiple official and unofficial venues for competition has sharpened the 
tenor and substance of factional rivalries.”32
 
Although principally concerned with foreign policy, Ray Takeyh’s Hidden Iran picks up 
similar themes, elucidating for an American audience how Iran’s domestic political 
rivalries shape its behaviour internationally.  Like Chehabi, Takeyh stresses Iran’s 
differences from a typical totalitarian state, emphasizing Iran’s competitive electoral 
traditions, its complex bureaucracy and the importance of key personalities in Iranian 
politics.  Takeyh underlines how decentralized and flexible the Islamic Republic has 
become since 1979, and points out that “Iran has not undergone the typical experience of 
a revolutionary state—namely, relinquishing its radical patrimony for more mundane 
temptations.  The perennial conflict between ideological determinations and practical 
considerations continues to plague the Islamic Republic.”33  Indeed, Takeyh suggests that 
Iran’s foreign policy is best understood as a “matrix with three competing elements—
Islamic ideology, national interests and factional politics.”34
 
Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr’s 2006 text Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for 
Liberty integrates analysis of Iranian history, Islam, political developments and civil 
society movements to elucidate how Iran has “responded to the challenge of balancing 
state-building with democracy-building.”35  Their work provides insight into the role of 
democracy in the Iranian political system, focusing on its traction at the grassroots level.  
Gheissari and Nasr argue what while Iran has been an “improbable candidate for the 
flowering of democracy…in many regards there is more progress toward democracy in 
Iran than in any other country in the Middle East, perhaps with the exception of 
Turkey.”36  This progress is reflected in regular elections, which actually influence 
policymaking and the distribution of power at national and local levels.  While there are 
many barriers to democracy in Iran, the country is home to a “citizenry that understands 
                                                 
32 Kamrava, M. and H. Hassan-Yari (2004) “Suspended Equilibrium in Iran's Political System”, Muslim 
World 94 (4), p. 495. 
33 Takeyh, R. (2006) Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations). 
34 Ibid. 
35 Gheissari, A., and V. Nasr (2006) Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. vii. 




the fundamental logic of democracy and the laws that govern its practice.”37  Gheissari 
and Nasr argue the “[d]emocracy in Iran was neither a project of the state nor imported as 
an ideal form of politics from the West…but has rather emerged as a grassroots 
phenomenon, so that democratic thinking and political expectations are prevalent in 
society and now serve as the main impetus for continued struggle toward democratic 
change.”38  The authors differentiate the Iranian case from the rest of the Middle East, 
because in Iran it is popular democratic attitudes rather than top-down reforms that 
account for the advance toward democracy.  They explore why theocratic Iran has made 
greater progress than its secular neighbours, and discuss the legacy of Iran’s experiences 
for democratization in the Muslim world.  Gheissari and Nasr suggest that the “seeming 
paradox” of the Iranian case lies in the complex nature of Iran’s deep-rooted struggle 
with democracy, and debates over the best route to development.39
 
Political Islam in Iran, 1979-2007 
 
Political Islam, or “Islam as political ideology” is by no means a monolithic school of 
thought.40  Rather, the variants of political Islam found around the world are shaped by 
diverse socio-economic, political, cultural and intellectual factors.  Generally speaking, 
political Islam may be described as the belief that “Islam as a body of faith has something 
important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary 
Muslim world”.41  Political scientist Guilian Denoeux defines political Islam as a “form 
of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue 
political objectives.  It provides political responses to today’s societal challenges by 
imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts 
borrowed from the Islamic tradition”.42
 
Ayoob points out that much of the literature and even academic discourse on the Muslim 
world assumes that there is no separation in Islam between the political and religious 
spheres.  Islamist rhetoric has contributed significantly to the popularity of this view, 
particularly in the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran, where the link between political 
life and Islam is enshrined in the Constitution and is essential to the legitimacy of the 
post-revolutionary state.  However, it is important to recognize that Shi’a thinking on the 
relationship between Islam and politics has historically been dominated by quietism, the 
view that the religious establishment should refrain from active engagement in politics.  
Quietism continues to be espoused by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani of Najaf, the pre-
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eminent Shi’a religious authority.  While the Iranian revolution was a major victory for 
advocates of an “activist” interpretation of Shi’a Islam, theological debates on the 
interface of politics and religion are far from over. 
 
Beinin and Stork discuss the history of political Islam in Iran, observing that numerous 
mullahs struggled against the Qajar and Pahlavi monarchies to establish the primacy of 
their authority.  Notably, however, the vast majority of clerics remained apolitical, and 
never tried to seize power before the 1979 revolution.  While a significant proportion of 
the mullahs’ struggle against the monarchy was shaped by local concerns, Beinin and 
Stork emphasize that the doctrine of velayat-e faqih did not emerge in total isolation from 
other Islamist movements.  Beinin and Stork argue that simple historical accounts of the 
evolution of political Islam often chart separate tracks for Sunnis and Shi’as.  However, a 
closer analysis reveals connections between the Sunni and Shi’a strands of political 
Islam.  For example, Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, an early Sunni leader of political 
Islamic thought, is credited with contributing to nationalist movements in Iran.43  
Nonetheless, the dominant form of political Islam in Iran is inseparable from Twelver 
Shi’ism, the main variant of Shi’ism in Iran.44
 
While in exile in Iraq, Ayatollah Khomeini developed the major theoretical lines of the 
doctrine of velayat-e faqih, or “rule of the Islamic jurist”.  In “The Rule of the Religious 
Jurist in Iran”, Abdulaziz Sachedina offers an accessible introduction to the velayat-e 
faqih, focusing on the political context in which the doctrine was articulated and has 
evolved.  Sachedina also explores the political and legal consequences of this 
perspective.45  A theory with little precedent in Shi’a political and theological thought, 
the doctrine posits that while waiting for the return of the hidden imam, legitimate 
Islamic governance is possible by having religious leaders serve “essentially as interim 
leaders”.46  In Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran, 
Vanessa Martin discusses Khomeini’s view that the clerical elite (fuqaha) have the right 
to identify a man within their own ranks to serve as the Supreme Leader or “ruling jurist” 
(vali-ye faqih).47  While Khomeini’s views on Islam and public life are often 
characterized as traditional or backward-looking, Martin stresses the deeply modern 
nature of Khomeini’s thought and political strategy. 
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The assumption of supreme political power by an Islamic jurist reflects Khomeini’s belief 
that divine laws must be enforced as the basis of Islamic society.  Accordingly, Khomeini 
argued that knowledge of Islamic laws and justice in implementing them are the two 
fundamental qualifications for political leadership.  An elaboration of this view is 
available in Hamid Algar’s well-regarded translation and annotation of Khomeini’s 
“Islamic Government”.48  In his seminal 1985 text The Mantel of the Prophet: Religion 
and Politics in Iran, Roy Mottahedeh provides a celebrated account of the revolutionary 
period and the emergence of Iran’s dominant forms of political Islam, interlacing history 
and biography with political and religious analysis.  Mottahedeh emphasises the “variety 
and complexity of Iranian culture”, which results in remarkably diverse responses to the 
revolution and the process of political change, from the national to individual levels.49
 
In the aftermath of the revolution, Iranian politics was replete with references to “Islamic 
ideology”, the origins and permeations of which are perceptively discussed in Hamid 
Dabashi’s monograph Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundations of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran.50  Although the doctrine of velayat-e faqih still garners avid 
support amongst Iran’s conservative clerical establishment, popular backing for the view 
has waned, prompting Iranian-American scholar Mohsen Milani to argue that with the 
emergence of the Iranian reform movement, an “ideological war” broke out between 
“two opposing paradigms of Islamic governance”.51  The conservative paradigm is firmly 
rooted in Khomeini’s teaching, and is based on “limited popular sovereignty”, while the 
second, reformist, paradigm advocates popular sovereignty as the “essence of 
governance”.52  The second paradigm is no less an Islamist view than the first, but is 
grounded in the belief that democracy is compatible with and complementary to Islam, 
and that “no authority can deprive the people from enjoying the divine gift of freedom”.53  
The second paradigm received widespread support amongst Iranian voters in the 1997 
presidential elections, but the “ideological war” floundered under Khatami’s leadership.  
Various observes suggest that Ahmadinejad’s electoral victory on a platform of anti-
corruption and “bread and butter” issues demonstrates that the majority of Iranian voters 
are much more concerned with day to day socio-economic conditions than debates about 
variants of political Islam. 
 
This view is bolstered by the research carried out by Mansoor Moaddel and Taqhi 
Azadarmaki on the worldviews of Islamic publics, drawing on the results of the 2000-
2001 World Values Surveys.  Moaddel and Azadarmaki compare the religious 
convictions, religiosity, national identity and views on gender relations, family and the 
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West held by Egyptians, Iranians and Jordanians.54  The survey data indicates that 97% of 
Egyptians and 96% of Jordanians said that religion was very important in their lives, 
compared to 79% of Iranians.  70% of the Egyptian respondents felt that religious 
authorities responded adequately to the country’s social problems, while the figure for 
Jordan was 60%.  In theocratic Iran, only 47% felt that religious authorities responded 
adequately to social problems.  While 64% of Egyptians and 85% of Jordanians felt that 
Western cultural invasion was one of the very important problems facing their countries, 
only 55% of Iranians held this view.  The authors conclude by suggesting that the nature 
of the national regime is a key determinant affecting variations in the respondents’ 
worldviews: “the experience of having lived for more than two decades under an Islamic 
fundamentalist regime has had a counter-productive effect, making Iranians less religious 
and less concerned about Western cultural invasion instead of more so.”55  They also note 
that the data indicates an intergenerational shift in Iran away from “fundamentalist 
beliefs.”56
 
The Iranian studies literature explores many different examples of how the experience of 
power has prompted different types of Islamists, such as ultra-conservative clerics and 
anti-American students, to revise their approach to both politics and religion.57  For 
example, Mir-Hosseini argues that “When they were in opposition, the clerics, as 
guardians of Islam, could deal with practical issues at an abstract and generalized level, 
leaving it to the conscience of the believer to interpret and carry out the appropriate 
practices.”58  However, “when shari’a becomes part of the apparatus of a modern nation 
state, its custodians may have to accommodate, even seek novel interpretations.  This 
opens room for change on a scale that has no precedent in Islamic history.”59  Scholars 
such as Boroujeradi, Schirazi and Kian Thiebaut have suggested that many members of 
the Islamist elite have undergone a process of secularization, prompted by their 
confrontation with issues for which there is no clear answer in shari’a.60  (Indeed, Sami 
Zubaida suggests that “ninety percent of legislation is on matters irrelevant to the Shari’a, 
such as administrative procedures, traffic regulations, economic policies and so on.”61)  
In Being Modern in Iran, Adelkhah explores how the experience of power changed 
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Islamists’ social role.  She writes, “Defence of their special corporate identity no longer 
seems a crucial issue, since an increasing number of men of religion participate fully not 
only in the exercise of power but much more widely in the life of society as doctors, 
journalists, deputies, mayors, military personnel, even television producers.”62
 
In “Trajectories of Political Islam: Egypt, Iran and Turkey”, Sami Zubaida gives a 
theoretically rigorous discussion of the evolution of Islamist movements, focusing on the 
“routinization of charisma”, and, in the Iranian case, the rationalization of the economy 
and government structures.  Zubaida argues that in “Iran, the country of the popular 
revolution that became Islamic, there is now a move away from Islamic government.  
Islamic ideology and institutions, in becoming part of the state and politics, lost their 
sanctity and charisma.”63  However, Zubaida stresses that this does not necessarily mean 
that interest in Islam itself has waned, and emphasizes that the conservative forces are 
well-positioned to resist any threat to the security of Islamist institutions. 
 
In Islam and Democracy (1996), Esposito and Voll engage in another comparative 
examination of six case studies that highlight diverse experiences of political Islam and 
Islamic movements around the world.  Esposito and Voll argue that discussion of Iran 
and Sudan is “clearly necessary in a study of Islam and democracy”, as “[these] two cases 
are often depicted as the prime examples of militant, revolutionary Islam.”64  The authors 
place the Iranian experience at one end of a spectrum that also includes “new style 
movements” in which Islamists are active participants in existing political systems 
(Malaysia and Pakistan), and cases in which Islamist movements are outlawed and at 
times violently suppressed (Egypt and Algeria).  Esposito and Voll note the high levels of 
popular political participation in Iran, and underline that “although the actual practice of 
the Islamic Republic is open to strong criticism for human rights abuses, suppression, and 
authoritarian rule, its leaders continue to affirm in the definition of the republic itself the 
importance of popular participation and maintaining the republic as a government of the 
people.”65  This book serves as a helpful introduction to influential American scholarship 
on Iran, as it is interwoven with references to analyses of post- Khomeini Iran, published 
in establishmentarian American journals such as Foreign Affairs.  For example, Esposito 
and Voll engage neoconservative scholar Fouad Ajami’s view that “A transformed Iran 
has emerged after the appropriation of political power by the theocrats and their flock… 
Judging by its record over a decade, it is a revolutionary state with cunning to match its 
ferocity, a state capable of organizing great campaigns and retreats and adjusting to 
things that can and cannot be.”66  Esposito and Voll also echo Hooglund’s assessment of 
the transition of power from Khomeini to Khamenei: “The broad consensus that allowed 
the smooth transition of power in Iran was reached by the spring of 1989 after a 
remarkably open debate of nearly a year.”67  In the second republic, “Iranian politics will 
involve much ongoing intra-regime bargaining, national debate and forming and 
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reforming of a consensus acceptable to most of the important actors and their 
constituencies.”68
 
The essays in Ramin Jahanbegloo’s edited collection Iran: Between Tradition and 
Modernity provide a detailed intellectual exploration of the relationship between Islam, 
modernity and political life in Iran.69  Zubaida also engages in a critical discussion of the 
interplay between Islam, political Islam and modernity in his chapter “Is Iran and Islamic 
State?”  Zubaida argues that while the “project of the Islamic Republic is to Islamize sate, 
society and culture…the basic processes of modernity in the socioeconomic and cultural 
fields, as well as in government, subvert and subordinate Islamization.  The Islamic 
authorities are often forced to adapt their policies and discourses to practical 
considerations.  ‘Secularization’ has not been reversed, but disguised behind imposed 
symbols and empty rhetoric.”70 Continuing the debate, Hamid Dabashi mounts a detailed 
historical rebuttal to the standard dichotomy between “traditional” and “modern” Iran, 
suggesting that this binary distorts understanding of the history and politics of Iran, and 
perpetuates colonialist mentalities.  As an alternative framework for understanding 
Iranian society, Dabashi forwards the concept of “anticolonial modernity”, which is 
grounded in Iranians’ struggles “against the colonial robbery of the moral and material 
foundations of [their] historical agency.”71
 
Challenges to mainstream political Islamism in Iran: ‘Abdolkarim Soroush and 
“dynamic jurisprudence” 
 
Non-clerical religious intellectuals have played a significant role in prompting Iranians to 
rethink the religious and political precepts upon which the Islamic Republic is based.  
Undoubtedly the most influential of these religious intellectuals (roshanfekrane dini) is 
the iconic ‘Abdolkarim Soroush.  A prominent ideologue in the early Islamic Republic, 
Soroush became disillusioned with post-revolutionary Iran and eventually transformed 
into one of its most compelling critics.  While Soroush is regarded in the seminaries as an 
“intellectual lightweight”, as a non-cleric he has been particularly successful in capturing 
the attention of the Iranian public.  The editors of a key annotated English collection of 
Soroush’s work contend that “‘Abdolkarim Soroush has emerged as the foremost Iranian 
and Islamic political philosopher and theologian.  His sprawling intellectual project, 
aimed at reconciling reason and faith, spiritual authority and political liberty, ranges 
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authoritatively over comparative religion, social science and theology.”72  His influence 
is reflected throughout much of the literature on reform and political Islam in Iran.  A 
pillar of Soroush’s views is the distinction he draws between “religion” and “religious 
knowledge”.  While Soroush argues that the Koran and hadiths are part of divine and 
eternal “religion”, the interpretation of these texts is a matter of human religious 
knowledge, and is thus open to debate.  Soroush sees democracy and human rights as 
core parts of contemporary non-religious knowledge, and argues that these principles 
must be integrated into Iranian society.  Soroush’s revisionist approach to Islam has had 
particularly strong traction within the Iranian women’s movement, as it has enabled 
scholars and activists to express their demands within an Islamic framework.73  Soroush’s 
views are critically examined in Afshin Matin-asgari’s “‘Abdolkarim Karim Soroush and 
the Secularization of Islamic Thought in Iran” and in Valla Vakili’s Debating Religion 
and Politics in Iran: The Political Thought of ‘Abdolkarim Soroush.74
 
Mir-Hosseini and Razavi discuss the implications of “dynamic jurisprudence” for 
establishmentarian conceptions of Islam and political Islam in Iran.75  Clerical advocates 
of dynamic jurisprudence argue that the rules of shari’a are time and place sensitive.  In 
identifying the requirements of Islam on a given issue, advocates of dynamic 
jurisprudence privilege the general principles of humanity and morality over “specific 
provisions found in various sources of Islamic jurisprudence—provisions which they 
generally contend were intended for, or are a product of, a different time, place and social 
context.”76  While this approach is vociferously rejected by the conservative Iranian 
clerical establishment, it has stimulated considerable reflection and debate amongst 
scholars and civil society members. 
 
Politics and governance in Iran 
  
The role of political parties and factions 
 
Confusingly, the literature on politics in Iran contains extensive references to political 
parties, as well as the oft-repeated observation that political parties are banned, or do not 
exist.  Stephen Fairbanks’ “Theocracy versus Democracy: Iran Considers Political 
Parties” provides insight into the history of political parties in Iran, and the ambiguous 
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use of the term “party” in Iran today.  Fairbanks argues that the establishment of political 
parties by civil groups is perceived as a direct threat to the clerics’ power, and is 
incongruous with the theory of velayat-e faqih.77  However, he points out that Article 26 
of the Iranian Constitution stipulates that the “formation of parties societies, political or 
professional associations, as well as religious societies, whether Islamic or pertaining to 
one of the recognized religious minorities, is permitted provided they do not violate the 
principles of independence, freedom, national unity, the criteria of Islam, or the basis of 
the Islamic Republic.”  In the tumultuous aftermath of the revolution, almost 100 new 
political organizations emerged, but the rapid growth in political parties endangered the 
stability of the new republic.  Consequently, Khomeini approved a harsh crackdown on 
the parties, and in 1981 a new law was passed defining political parties and the legitimate 
scope of their activities.  The new law made the creation of political parties dependent on 
the acquisition of a permit from the Ministry of the Interior.  However, the 
implementation of the commission to authorize political parties was persistently 
postponed, due to the Iran-Iraq war and the fact that the vast majority of parties had 
already been banned.  On the grounds that it had served its purpose of saving Iranians 
from “falling into the trap of the parties”, the dominant Islamic Republic Party was 
voluntarily dissolved in 1986 by its leaders, then-president Khamenei and Rafsanjani.78
 
Fairbanks writes that despite the stagnation of the 1981 political parties law, the leading 
candidates for the 1997 presidential election were supported for the first time by “quasi-
party, political organizations”.  Although not official political parties, Fairbanks suggests 
that their involvement in the election was a significant step towards the creation of formal 
parties.  These “quasi-parties” included the powerful, conservative Militant Clergy 
Association (Jame’eh-ye Rowhaniyat-e Mobarez, initially created in 1936 in opposition 
to Reza Shah); the leftist Militant Clerics Society (Majma ‘-e Rowhaniyun-e Mobarez), 
and the influential Kargozaran, a group of moderate technocrats founded by key officials 
from the Rafsanjani government.  These and other groups resembled political parties in 
that several had their own newspapers and publicity systems, and effectively mobilized 
political support for their candidates.79  These “parties” continue to exert influence in 
Iranian politics, although many are better described as factions.80
 
As Fairbanks argues, one of the principal problems with Iran’s factions has been their 
tendency to be subsumed by the parochial interests of particular groups or individuals.  
Many of the factions have struggled to develop cogent, issue-oriented policy platforms.  
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These challenges are discussed in greater detail by Iranian scholar Hossein Seifzadeh in 
his article “The Landscape of Factional Politics and its Future in Iran.”81  Seifzadeh 
opens his discussion with the observation that factional sparring has dominated the 
Iranian political landscape since 1979, and argues that due to the populist nature of 
Iranian politics, the factional leaders make ambitious promises that cannot be achieved.  
This inevitably results in popular discontent, and creates a political environment prone to 
the emergence of charismatic elites and cleavages among political factions.82  Seifzadeh 
provides a schematic of factional politics in Iran, distinguishing between the reformists, 
pragmatists (associated with elite supporters of Rafsanjani) and fundamentalists.83 All of 
these groups fall within the “pro-Islamic Republic” sphere.  He goes on to highlight the 
debates between and amongst the members of these factions, analyzing their political 
discourse on domestic and international issues, and emphasizing the importance of 
culture in Iranian factional politics.  Despite their strong hold on power, Seifzadeh argues 
that “politicized traditionalists represent a tiny minority in Iran.”84 While the 
traditionalists, pragmatists and reformists embrace different approaches to the meaning of 
Islam and its implications for policy, Seifzadeh argues that each faction has been able to 
recruit supporters from both traditional and modern sectors of Iranian society, including 
from within the clergy.  However, Seifzadeh notes that due to the diminishing popularity 
of the clerics, the reformists have revamped their political associations, reorganizing 
themselves by political considerations rather than clerical affiliations.85
 
Using a world system analysis, Saeidi offers an alternative perspective on the reasons for 
the emergence of political factions in Iran, and the implications of this system.  Saeidi 
suggests that political factions are intensifying, and that “[p]ost-revolutionary politics has 
been the scene of clashes between left and right factions that ha[ve] caused political 
uncertainty, [reflected in] the dislocation of the post-revolutionary state in the world-
system.”86 Indeed, Saeidi argues that “clashes between the major political factions are the 
energy source that drives domestic and foreign policies in Iran,” and that “the emergence 
of political factionalism prevented the establishment of a unified and dominant political 
and economic approach inside the country non-hostile to the world-system.”87
 
Haleh Afshar complements this work by providing a brief discussion of the impact the 
absence of political parties has had on Iranian women politicians.  Afshar suggests that 
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the absence of formal parties has been a “mixed blessing”, enabling women to campaign 
as individuals unconstrained by party lines.  However, the lack of a party system 
translates into heavy financial burdens for prospective candidates, which can be 
particularly difficult for women, who need to negotiate campaign financing with their 
husbands.88
 
In his short article “The Changing Landscape of Party Politics in Iran: A Case Study”, 
Abbas William Samii provides a more up-to-date overview of the party system in Iran, 
and a brief analysis of the emergence of the Jamiyat-I Isargaran-I Inqilab-I Islami party 
(Isargaran), and its role in President Ahmadinejad’s 2005 election victory.  Samii 
contends that political parties “took off” in Iran after the 1997 election victory of 
President Khatami, an advocate of the role of political parties in civil society.  In 2000, 
Khatami created a “House of Parties” to provide a legal framework for party activities, 
but Samii recognizes that many licensed political parties continue to have no real political 
role.  Furthermore, the party system is complicated by the fact the individuals can belong 
to several parties, and that the parties do not actually field candidates in Iranian elections.  
Instead, the parties publish lists of the candidates they support, with the parties in a 
particular faction rarely supporting the same candidates.89  Samii underlines two key 
features of the Iranian political system; the first is its dynamism and unpredictability.  
“Under these circumstances,” Samii argues, “using historical examples, possessing a 
thorough knowledge of [the] system’s institutions and legal framework, and knowing the 
specific personalities are essential” to understanding the system.90  Second, parties such 
as Isargaran and politicians such as Ahmadinejad represent a younger generation 
influenced predominantly by the experience of the Iran-Iraq war, rather than the 
experience of the revolution.  The growing power of younger Iranians, and their 
formative political experiences, must be borne in mind when analyzing the development 
of political parties in Iran.91
 
Women in Iranian politics 
 
Western media coverage often fixates on the draconian elements of Iran’s women’s rights 
policies, obscuring the significant achievements Iranian women have made since the 
revolution.  To be sure, Khomeini sharply curtailed many of the freedoms Iranian women 
enjoyed under the Pahlavi regime, through measures such as expelling women from the 
judiciary, forcing women to wear the hejab, limiting their free movement, and repealing 
the Family Protection Act.  While women’s rights in Iran are far from secure, many of 
these early policies have been revised, and significant gains have been made in many 
areas.  For instance, women’s literacy rates have improved remarkably since the 
revolution, and 63% of Iranian university students are now women.92  Many of these 
gains are attributable to the efforts of Iranian women politicians and civil society leaders, 
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and have been examined in-depth by a number of authors, particularly Iranian women 
scholars working abroad.93  A popular theme in this literature is the observation that “the 
Islamic Republic has not opened the gates.  Women are jumping over the fences.”94
 
Seminal English texts on women’s political roles in the Islamic Republic include Parvin 
Paidar’s Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-Century Iran.95  Paidar examines 
how Iranian women have influenced and been influenced by revolutionary and 
evolutionary processes in Iran, challenging the conventional notion of Muslim women as 
marginalized.  In contrast, Paidar maintains that gender issues are at the centre of 
contemporary Iranian politics.  Similarly, Hamideh Sedghi’s Women and Politics in Iran: 
Veiling, Unveiling and Reveiling locates contention over women at the heart of the 
struggle between Islamists and secularists.96  Using the hejab as an entry-point for 
discussion, Sedghi interweaves economic, political and cultural analyses to suggest that 
control over women’s labour, identifies and sexuality is central to the consolidation of 
state power in Iran.  Mir-Hosseini echoes Paidar and Sedghi’s view that women’s rights 
are one of the main “battlegrounds” between modernists and traditionalists in Iran.  
However, Mir-Hosseini suggests that with the birth of the reformist movement, this 
struggle became part of a broader conflict between two different views of Islam.  The 
first is an “absolutist and legalistic Islam, premised on the notion of ‘duty’, tolerating no 
dissent and making little concession to popular will and contemporary realities.”97 The 
second is a pluralistic, tolerant conception of Islam that accords with human rights and 
democratic principles. 
 
Along with Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Paidar was particularly instrumental in advancing debates 
on the notion of Islamist feminism, and understandings of how Iranian women are 
constructed by different political discourses and institutions.98  While Islamic feminism 
eludes a neat definition, Mir-Hosseini describes it as “a new consciousness, a new way of 
thinking, a gender discourse that is ‘feminist’ in its aspirations and demands, yet is 
‘Islamic’ in its language and sources of legitimacy.”99  Afsaneh Najmabadi analyzes how 
Islamic feminist journals such as Zanan have engaged in interpreting the Islamic texts to 
                                                 
93 See for example Esfandiari, H. (1997) Reconstructed Lives: Women and Iran’s Islamic Revolution 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press).  Esfandiari’s text explores Iranian women’s responses to the 
Iranian revolution, and the strategies through which women have subverted the state’s agenda.  For a 
general discussion of the role of women in Islamist movements, see Abdellatif, O. and Ottaway, M. (2007) 
“Women in Islamist Movements: Toward and Islamist Model of Women’s Activism”, Carnegie Papers 2. 
94 Moghissi, H. (1994) Populism and Feminism in Iran: Women’s struggle in a male-defined revolutionary 
movement (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press), p. 183. 
95 Paidar, P. (1997) Women and the Political Process in Twentieth Century Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
96 Sedghi, H. (2007) Women and Politics in Iran: Veiling, Unveiling and Reveiling (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press).  A number of authors have focused on the role of the hejab or chador in “Islamizing” 
public and private space in Iran.  See for example Kar, M. (2003) “The Invasion of the Private Sphere in 
Iran”, Social Research 70 (3). 
97 Mir-Hosseini, Z. (2002) “The Conservative-Reformist Conflict Over Women's Rights in Iran”, 
International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 16 (1), p. 37. 
98 See Mir-Hosseini, Z. (2002) “Religious Modernists and the ‘Woman Question’”, in Hooglund 2002. 
99 Mir-Hosseini, Z. (2004) “The Quest for Gender Justice: Emerging Feminist Voices in Islam”, Islam 21 




advance the cause of women’s rights.  Najmabadi notes that “the dominant method of 
reformist interpretation… has been to use more woman-friendly sources from an already 
existing set of authoritative exegetical texts.  This confined the reinterpretive attempts to 
a highly misogynous canon, producing an endless array of contradictory positions for 
reformers.”100  In contrast, Zanan set out to provide fresh interpretation (often by women) 
of the texts directly relevant to women’s lives.  Zanan’s revisionist approach placed 
women and their needs at the centre of the interpretive domain.101  Najmabadi recognizes 
that Zanan’s efforts to promote ijtihad  “brought the fire of the more traditional Islamic 
advocates upon them,” but applauds Zanan’s efforts to advance the debate on women’s 
rights in Iran, in particular by breaking down the dichotomy between secular and Islamic 
women in Iran.102
 
Haleh Afshar offers a particularly insightful discussion of the role of Iranian women 
politicians in advancing the status of women in the Islamic Republic.103  Afshar points 
out that while Iranian women’s support was instrumental to the success of the revolution, 
the post-revolutionary state has failed to meet their expectations in terms of improving 
the condition of women in Iran.  While the Constitution places women first and foremost 
in the home, Afshar discusses how Iranian women have challenged this designation, 
seeking out the opportunity to shape the republic’s political life by serving as elected 
political representatives, particularly in the majlis.104  Afshar recognizes that only a small 
number of Iranian women have won seats in the majlis: four of the 270 members elected 
to the first post-revolutionary parliament were women, and the numbers remained in the 
single-digits until after the death of Khomeini and the end of the Iran-Iraq War.  14 
women were elected to the fifth majlis (1996) (5.1% of MPs), and 11 to the sixth (2000) 
(3.7% of MPs).105  Despite their diverse socio-economic backgrounds and political and 
religious views, Afshar argues that Iranian women politicians have generally been able to 
work together, and have made important strides in “gradually clawing back rights denied 
to them”, by “assiduously formulat[ing] their demands in terms of Islamic teachings”.106  
Indeed, Afshar suggests that “by situating their demands firmly in the context of the 
Islamic teaching, women parliamentarians have formed the only long-lasting, acceptable 
political opposition in a system that does not allow political parties and has driven 
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underground almost all other opponents”.107  Afshar attributes this success to the 
women’s ability to use their family networks and knowledge of Islamic law to ensure that 
they were perceived as loyal defenders of Islam.108  
 
Azadeh Kian takes a somewhat bleaker view of the success of the Iranian women’s 
movement in the decade after the revolution.  She suggests that during this period, female 
Iranian political leaders failed to offer a reading of Islam and shari’a that was more 
responsive to women’s concerns.  Kian argues that these efforts failed because they were 
principally based on “traditionalist interpretations” of the Islamic texts, and because the 
status of women was not a priority for the Iranian elite during the Iran-Iraq war.  
However, the end of the war saw the rise of a “new generation of gender-conscious 
Islamist women” who forged allegiances with secular women, presented a more modern 
reading of Islam, and made strong demands for improvements in the condition of women, 
ably using political levers to achieve their goals.  Kian’s work draws on interviews with 
Islamist women who were leaders in this process.109
 
Adopting a more journalistic approach, Ziba Mir-Hosseini provides insight into the career 
and resignation of Fatemeh Maqiqatjoo, a female reformist MP.  Mir-Hosseini also 
discusses the more conservative orientation of the 12 female MPs elected to the seventh 
majlis, who have already distanced themselves from earlier female MPs’ efforts to 
prompt Iran to sign the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW), and facilitate single Iranian women’s opportunities to study 
abroad.110
 
Paidar’s 2002 chapter “Encounters between Feminism, Democracy and Reformism in 
Contemporary Iran” places the work of Iranian women MPs in a broader political and 
theoretical context.  Paidar highlights the “opportunities that women have created and 
used to enact their rights within the existing authoritarian context…illustrat[ing]…the 
paradox of weak democratic institutions and active female citizenship.”111  Paidar 
suggests that a “new window of opportunity…has been opened through the ongoing 
dialogue between and within the democratization and women’s rights movements.  The 
new strands of political thought and discourse and the dialogue between them…present 
more emancipatory potential for women’s rights than democratic institutions have had in 
Iran since their inception.”112  The force of Paidar’s argument is weakened when 
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considered in the context of the resurgence of conservatism and restrictionism in Iran 
since Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005.  However, her detailed analysis provides valuable 
insight into the evolution of the women’s movement in Iran, and its connections to 
reformism and democratization.  For example, Paidar explains that given women’s 
instrumental role in the revolution, their electoral participation was essential to post-
revolutionary Iran’s populist image.  Interestingly, Paidar suggests that one of the most 
effective forms of protest by Islamist women in the eighties and nineties was the 
awareness women parliamentarians and publications created regarding the injustices 
perpetrated against women from the social groups that were the “grassroots supporters of 
the Islamic Republic”, including war widows.113
 
The role of civil society 
 
Characterizations of Iranian civil society run the full gambit from robust and vibrant to 
“paper thin”.114  To be sure, many civil society organizations concerned with human 
rights and democracy have been labelled “agents of imperialism” and suffered extreme 
repression.115  There is a considerable body of strong English scholarly literature on 
reformist civil society groups (see following section on political movements), and a more 
limited number of studies of the powerful Islamist foundations (bonyads), which elude 
easy categorization as governmental or independent organizations (see following section 
on the bonyads’ agenda and policy influence).  In addition to this, a few authors have 
provided insightful macro-level discussions of the role of civil society in Iranian politics, 
and the connections between civil society and political Islam. 
 
For instance, through a survey of recent Farsi publications, Mehran Kamrava offers a 
valuable analysis of the civil society discourse in Iran.  Kamrava identifies four key 
characteristics of how Iranian scholars view the concept of civil society.  First, Kamrava 
argues that the concept of civil society has undergone a “substantial process of 
indigenization.”116  Second, Iranian theorists argue that the “rule of law” is critical to civil 
society, which implies that the state has a primary role to play by “‘coexisting in 
harmony’ and functioning as an integral part of civil society.”117  Third, Kamrava points 
out that “even Iran’s secular theorists have not been able to fully evade the gravitational 
pull of Islam and its overwhelming role in Iranian culture and society.  At the very least, 
they maintain that civil society is possible only after a ‘proper’ interpretation of Islam 
gains popular acceptance.”118  Fourth, Kamrava suggests that Iranian theorists are 
preoccupied with non-Iranians’ perception of the Islamic Republic.  This affects how 
Iranian elites portray “culture” to domestic and international audiences.  Kamrava 
concludes that “whereas the articulations of Iranian scholars and politicians [on civil 
society] appear to be little more than a native version of a global academic trend”, the 
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most significant consequence of the “discovery of ‘civil society’” in Iran is that it seems 
to have “ignited a subtle process of cultural re-orientation and re-articulation under the 
rubric of religion and an institutionalized Islamic Republican State.”119  Kamrava’s work 
is particularly helpful in that it provides insight into the development of Farsi scholarship 
on Iranian civil society.  Kamrava points out that Iranian scholars only began publishing 
work on civil society in the late 1990s, and that the number of books devoted to the topic 
is minimal. 
 
Several scholars have offered perceptive analysis of different sectors of Iranian civil 
society.  For example, Elaheh Rostami Povey offers an insightful discussion of two 
particularly important types of civil society organizations in Iran, trade unions and 
women’s NGOs.  Povey argues that trade unions have had a significant role in changing 
the Iranian political system over the past ninety years, but underlines the male-dominated 
character of these organizations.  Povey compares the trade unions with women’s NGOs, 
which typically focus on ameliorating the socio-economic conditions facing the poorest 
parts of Iranian society.  While the women’s NGOs have not engaged in structural reform 
efforts, Povey argues that “they are challenging gender-specific access and influence over 
institutional power, matters that are crucial to the process of democratization.”120  As 
trade unions and women’s NGOs adopt different approaches to strengthening 
community-based organizations, Povey suggests that “their collaboration would have a 
mutually transformational impact which would turn these organizations into more 
powerful forces in the process of democratization.”121  Ladjevardi also offers a significant 
(if dated) discussion of the Iranian labour movement in Labour Unions and Autocracy in 
Iran.122 In “Postrevolutionary Iran and the New Social Movements”, Khosrokhavar 
discusses three principal social movements: the youth movement, the intellectual 
movement, and the women’s movement.  Khosrokhavar argues that these contemporary 
movements had their genesis in the modernization of Iranian society, which partially 
prompted the 1979 revolution.123  This view is challenged by scholars such as Moslem.124
 
Gerhardt offers an interesting examination of the connection between sport and the 
development of Iranian civil society.  Gerhardt highlights the dominance of sport in the 
Iranian public sphere and the significance of Iran’s World Cup victory in France against 
the United States, suggesting that sport mobilized Iranian youth and challenged the 
dominance of the state.  Gerhardt argues that sport prompted increased autonomy of 
Iranian civil society and explains Iranians began to forge a new national identity through 
sport.  This identity has been appropriated by the state as well as by the reform 
movement.125   
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In contrast to those scholars who focus on elite-led civil society movements, Bayat 
provides a detailed discussion of poor people’s movements in Iran from 1977 to the early 
1990s.  Bayat observes that in large Iranian cities between 1976 and the early 1990s, a 
series of “popular activities” took place which received little media or scholarly attention, 
as they were “drowned out by the extraordinary big bang” of the revolution.126  These 
activities had their genesis is large-scale rural-urban migration, and included the creation 
and consolidation of new communities of poor people in Iran’s largest cities.  Bayat 
suggests that the “mundane, ordinary and daily nature” of these activities belied their true 
political significance, and uses his examination of Iranian poor peoples’ movements to 
demonstrate the variations in ordinary Iranians’ experiences of social and political 




The literature on Iranian civil society underlines that “ideas count for a lot in Iran.”  
Philosophical debates are woven throughout the national political discourse, and figure 
prominently in popular newspapers and journals.  The theocratic nature of the Iranian 
state means that religious scholars and intellectuals play prominent roles in Iranian public 
life.  For example, intellectuals such as ‘Abdolkarim Soroush have significantly 
influenced the shape of the contemporary reform movement (see earlier section on 
political Islam in Iran).  The role of Iranian intellectuals in civil society has been 
examined by a number of authors such as Gheissari, Boroujerdi, Jahanbegloo and 
Sadri.128  Jahanbegloo identifies a “Fourth Generation” of Iranian intellectuals (younger 
scholars in their thirties and forties), and argues that they have a “strategic role to play in 
building a strong civil society” and supporting the democratization process.129  “Their 
role,” Jahanbegloo states, “is not one of engaging in ideological politics, but of 
expressing critical views concerning the antidemocratic and authoritarian aspects of 
Iranian political and social traditions, as well as of encouraging the people to be wary of 
all forms of utopian thinking and dreams of totally rearranging Iranian society.”130  Sadri 
shares Jahanbegloo’s assessment of the pivotal role intellectuals play in Iranian civil 
society, focusing in particular on the contributions members of the “religious 
intelligentsia” make to the reform movement.  Sadri’s work emphasizes intellectuals’ key 
role as leaders in the dynamic Iranian press, and the roots of many prominent reformist 
intellectuals as radical Islamists in the revolutionary period.131
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In “Critics from Within: Islamic Scholars’ Protests Against the Islamic State in Iran”, 
Charles Kurzman examines Iran’s dissident Islamic scholars.  Kurzman offers a focused 
analysis of the practical and theoretical implications of the protests against the Islamic 
Republic raised by several prominent Islamic scholars, including Ali Montazeri, Mohsen 
Sa‘idzadeh and Mohsen Kadivar.  These dissident scholars do not belong to a unified 
group, and identify themselves as political Islamists in varying degrees.  However, they 
share a commitment to preserving the long Shi’a tradition of scholarly debate and 
critique, which is often perceived as a threat by the ruling authorities.  Indeed, Kurzman 
suggests that “seminary intellectuals are now among the greatest threats to the Islamic 
Republic of Iran”, given that in “Iran, unlike most countries, epistemological debates 
have political implications.”132  Kurzman examines how “seminary-trained scholars have 
applied their critical methods to basic issues of state legitimately, in particular the state’s 
right to insist on interpretive closure.”133  The Iranian Constitution places limits on 
seminarians’ right to contest interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence by conferring upon 
the Supreme Leader the right of interpretive closure, or “the right to end debate on a 
subject.”134  Kurzman details the cases of five prominent seminarians who challenged the 
regime’s positions on questions such as women’s rights and democracy, and the broader 
principal of interpretive closure.135  The five cases share a common thread: each of the 
seminarians disagreed with the religious establishment on a substantive political issue, 
was pressured to defer to the regime’s interpretation, and embraced an even more 
dissident position by rejecting the Supreme Leader’s right of interpretive closure.  
Ironically, the “scholars’ positions were not originally subversive of the political order, 
but were intended to strengthen it by elaborating what they considered proper Islamic 
reforms.  These reforms”, whether on women’s rights or political parties, “would save the 
Islamic Republic from becoming sterile, unpopular, and ineffective.”136   Kurzman 
underlines that the regime’s policy of responding to its clerical critics with force has 
“backfired, as each escalating punishment has generated new critics within.”137
  
The internet and Iranian civil society 
 
Although discussion of the phenomenon does not yet appear to have percolated 
thoroughly into the academic literature, the western media has highlighted Iran’s 
profligate bloggers and “electronic” civil society.138  These reports point out that some 
7.5 million Iranians (11% of the population) use the internet on a regular to semi-regular 
basis, and that Farsi is the third most popular language for blogging in the world.  
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Prominent bloggers include not only liberal, well-educated youth, but also clerics and 
politicians including President Ahmadinejad.  Although conservative authorities have 
shut down more than one hundred newspapers since 2000, they have been slower to act in 
censoring the internet.  At the same time, new websites appear with remarkably rapidity 
to replace banned sites, demonstrating Iranian civil society’s ability to use electronic 
tools to communicate their concerns and advance their goals.139
 
Iranian foundations (bonyads): Social agenda and policy influence 
 
In addition to the civil society organisations discussed above and in the following section 
on political movements, Iranian politics and social life are definitively shaped by a 
number of Islamic foundations (bonyads) and the bazaar.  English-language literature on 
these institutions seems to be relatively rare, but insightful. 
 
Ali Saeidi, a sociology professor at Tehran University, offers a valuable discussion of 
Iranian Islamic foundations (bonyads), focusing on the accountability of these parastatal 
organizations.  Saeidi’s paper examines the emergence and evolution of the bonyads, 
underlining their distorting impact on the Iranian political economy.  Saeidi suggests that 
the bonyads “represent the dual power structure in Iran which reinforces the financial 
authority of religious leaders without accountability.”140  Saeidi argues that the bonyads’ 
economic policies bolster the government’s populist macroeconomic policies, often with 
adverse political and developmental effects.  While Saeidi recognizes the bonyads’ 
antecedents as independent, apolitical charitable foundations (awqaf), he maintains that 
the bonyads were a “unique product of the 1979 revolution”.141  After the revolution, 
property belonging to the Shah and his close associates was confiscated and transferred to 
the religious leaders in the form of newly created bonyads.  This increased the 
revolutionary leaders’ financial independence, and resulted in the bonyads controlling 
hundreds if not thousands of industrial enterprises.142 Initially intended to ensure the 
implementation of religious principles that were not fully integrated into the functions of 
the Islamic state, such as the collection of alms taxes, the administration of awqaf and the 
provision of assistance to the poor, the bonyads gradually took on a much more 
expansive role in post-revolutionary Iran.  Saeidi argues that the bonyads facilitated the 
social mobility of the revolutionary forces, supported the state’s Islamist ideology, and 
contributed to the consolidation of the clerics’ political power. 
 
Saeidi underlines the bonyads’ para-governmental character: while the bonyads receive 
enormous governmental subsidies and provide many services that typically fall within 
state’s remit, they are exempt from taxes and normal financial reporting requirements, 
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and have resisted many of the state’s key economic and political reform efforts.143  “What 
is often not realized widely about these organizations”, Saeidi argues, “is that they have 
been actively involved in [the] Iranian polity by propagating the dominant ideology in a 
wide range of social and cultural activities.”144  While it is difficult to assess the efficacy 
of the bonyads’ assistance to the poor and vulnerable, Saeidi suggests that at least some 
foundations support those who are closely affiliated with the government, rather than 
providing assistance on an equitable basis.  Saeidi illustrates his arguments with short 
case studies of a number of prominent foundations, and suggests that the “closed flow of 
information in [and about] these organizations… embodies a traditional moral order, that 
is to say, a religious moral system of non-reciprocal rights of religious leaders to control 
these resources.”145  In essence, the bonyad system “institutionalized the right of religious 
leaders not to disclose their activities to the people…democratization is impossible 
without improving the flow and transparency of these organizations’ financial 
information.”146  Saeidi concludes on an optimistic note, suggesting that the discreet 
pressure being applied inside and outside of Iran may translate into greater accountability 
from the bonyads.  The impact of the Ahmadinejad presidency on this process is, 
however, a matter of speculation. 
 
Maloney’s study complements Saeidi’s work by focusing on the largest and most 
influential of Iran’s revolutionary foundations, the Bonyad-e Mostazafan va Janbazan.  
Maloney argues that the bonyads have become “pivotal actors in the enduring rivalry 
among the ideologically oriented factions within the clerical establishment…the 
evolution of the bonyads as a semi-autonomous centre of power redistributes the 
relationship among the various social groups (especially the bazaaris, or traditional 
merchants) whose support is key to the government’s survival.  Consequently, the 
bonyads furnish a highly appropriate framework for the analysis of the post-revolutionary 
Iranian order, for they are neither wholly of the state, nor wholly distinct from it.  Their 
narrative epitomizes the structural and ideological transformation of the Islamic state—
from the incipient expansion of state apparatus and institutionalization of the ideological 
objectives of the revolution, to the drive for post-war reconstruction, economic 
competitiveness and organizational integration.”147  Maloney also emphasizes the 
importance of the bonyad’s “strategic mission as agents of economic development and 
income redistribution”, which accords the foundations a “mantle of social justice” which 
is integral to their political legitimacy in Iran’s Islamic system.148
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In “Constitutionalism, Modernization and Islamization: The Political Economy of Social 
Policy in Iran”, Mahmood Messkoub offers a critical assessment of the evolution of 
Iranian social policy in the twentieth century, including a discussion of the role of several 
Islamic foundations in providing social services to poor Iranians.  Messkoub argues that 
there has been a “remarkable degree of continuity in the development of social policy in 
Iran.”149  Although the revolutionary authorities inherited reasonably well-developed 
social service delivery systems, development indicators in 1979 were extremely low.  For 
example, the infant mortality rate was approximately 100 per 1000 live births.  The 
“popular demands of the revolution with regard to equality and improved living standards 
were enshrined in the Constitution”, and marked advances have been achieved, although 
certain groups receive special treatment in post-revolutionary Iran, particularly members 
of the armed forces, the clergy and seminary students.150  Messkoub writes that the 
“political influence of religion on social policy goes far beyond such special privileges 
and here lies an important departure from pre-revolution practices.  Before the revolution 
access to state-run health and welfare institutions was not used as a means of mass social 
control… But since the revolution access to some social welfare programmes has become 
an important instrument of social control.”151
 
In Bazaar and State in Iran, Arang Keshavarzian discusses the politics of the bazaar, 
another critical Islamic entity in contemporary Iran.  Keshavarzian’s monograph is one of 
the only in-depth English analyses of bazaari politics, and examines the economics and 
politics of the bazaar under the Pahlavis and in the post-revolutionary era.  While the 
Pahlavis’ modernization campaign sought to undermine the bazaar, the revolutionary 
authorities were committed to preserving the bazaar as an ‘Islamic institution’.  However, 
Keshavarzian’s analysis demonstrates that the outcomes of these policies were 
antithetical to their intentions: the bazaar thrived under the Shah despite his hostile 
approach.  Indeed, the bazaar maintained so much autonomy that it played a significant 
part in the revolution.  In contrast, the Islamic leaders’ policies inadvertently transformed 
the bazaar’s operations, and undermined its ability to mobilize politically.152
 
Political movements: Reformism, conservatism and other trends 
 
Contrary to simplistic media portrayals of the Iranian political landscape, the vast 
majority of the literature on contemporary Iranian politics underlines that neither 
reformism nor conservatism are monolithic movements.  The International Crisis Group’s 
2002 study breaks down the Iranian political factions into conservatives and reformists, 
as well as intellectual and Islamic dissenters.  Each bloc has its own sub-groups.  For 
example, the reform camp includes technocrats, members of the modernist right and the 
Islamic left.  The ICG report points out that Iranians’ political alignments often shift 
depending on the issue at hand.153
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The English literature on Iranian political movements appears to focus principally on the 
reformist camp, rather than on conservative movements and other trends.154  However, 
the evolving relationship between reformism and conservatism is explored by numerous 
authors.  For example, David Manashri notes that the contest between these groups is a 
profound debate that straddles issues of Islam and democracy, idealism versus 
pragmatism, the relationship between religion and state.155  While the pursuit of political 
freedom is discussed at length in the literature, the struggle for social and economic 
development appears to be equally if not more important to the Iranian public.  Yet, this 
aspect is often overlooked in much of the literature on the conflict between the reform 
and conservative movements.  Since Ahmadinejad’s election underlined the critical 
nature of these issues for Iranian voters, it is possible that forthcoming literature will 
respond more comprehensively to these issues. 
 
The reform movement 
 
The Iranian reform movement is perhaps the most thoroughly studied aspect of 
contemporary Iranian politics, and issues of reform and modernization are cross-cutting 
themes throughout much of the literature.  While there is some discussion in the 
American media and literature on prompting regime change in Iran through military 
action or other forms of outside interference, many if not most scholars of the reform 
movement seem to embrace Jahanbegloo’s view that “[t]here is no question that working 
within the Islamic system is the best way to initiate reforms in Iran.”156  Indeed, many 
members of the reform movement identify themselves as Islamist. 
 
Many of the most detailed studies of the reform movement were published during the 
Khatami presidency, when the reform movement was at its zenith.157  Paidar suggests that 
that erosion of popular support for the hard-line state, and the rise of the reform 
movement was prompted by “economic stagnation, war, authoritarianism, corruption, and 
misappropriation of funds, as well as the state’s attempts to regulate the private and 
public lives of its citizens.  These factors gradually eroded the mass support for the 
Islamic Republic and amounted to a crisis of legitimacy for the hard-liners controlling the 
key apparatuses of the state.”158  Many of these studies reflect an optimism about the 
strength of the reform movement that has not proven to be entirely warranted, given the 
2005 election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  Many analyses completed since 2005 suggest 
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that while the reform movement suffers from deep internal divisions, a lack of clear 
vision, and a seeming inability to respond to voters’ socio-economic concerns, it would 
be premature to conclude that reformism is entirely defunct. 
  
Key studies of the reform movement include Daniel Brumberg’s Reinventing Khomeini: 
The Struggle for Reform in Iran, and Ali Ansari’s Iran, Islam and Democracy: The 
Politics of Managing Change.  Brumberg’s work links Khomeini’s legacy with the 
trajectory of political change in post-Khomeini Iran, suggesting that “Khomeini’s own 
efforts to accommodate competing visions of political community set the stage for an 
ideological struggle over his legacy in the nineties.”  Further, Brumberg asserts that the 
“[A]yatollah’s story convey[s] lessons that appl[y] not merely to the evolution of 
‘Islamic’ politics in Iran, but also to the transformation of such politics in the wider 
Islamic world.”159  Brumberg develops the concept of “the politics of dissonant 
institutionalization”, and suggest that this phenomenon opens up “possibilities for 
ideological change that conventional views of both Islamic politics and charismatic 
movements could not easily anticipate.”160
 
In the second edition of Iran, Islam and Democracy, Ansari provides an updated analysis 
of the Iranian reform movement, examining how it endeavoured to reconcile political 
Islam with democratic principles, and asking how it failed with the election of 
Ahmadinejad in 2005.  Ansari’s historical analysis captures the intellectual intensity of 
the reform movement, and provides a thorough discussion of the theoretical context of 
the reform movement; the discourse of reform; the influence of Iranian presidents 
Rafsanjani and Khatami; the impact of the hardliners’ crackdown on reformists; the 
influence of the mercantile elite; and the roles of the different (often competing) actors in 
the reform movement, including students, the press, intellectuals, religious figures, and 
politicians.  The central thesis of the first edition of Ansari’s book revolved around a 
“social revolution driven by an intellectual renaissance,” which necessitated a “delicate 
balance between popular demand and vested interest.”161
 
In the second edition, Ansari suggests that the reformists’ defeat was rooted in factors 
including the political leaders’ indecisive and overly cautious approach, and the fact that 
reformists found themselves caught between increasingly polarized political forces which 
were not interested in compromising with the reformists. The reformists also had to 
contend with the oppressive tactics employed by their powerful opponents in the militias 
and conservative factions.  Further, Ansari suggests that “sections of the conservative 
establishment had learned their lessons well.  Whereas reformists had once possessed 
vision in abundance, they now offered only fear; where the conservatives had offered 
only austerity, Ahmadinejad now proffered a utopia.”162  Ansari decries the “hollowness 
of [the hardline administration’s] domestic triumph”, and suggests that while the “public 
may have grown tired of the unfulfilled promises of the reformist leadership…such 
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dissatisfaction did not necessarily translate into a rejection of ‘reform’ as an idea.”163  
Rather, Ahmadinejad’s victory was “a product of division and desperation”.164  However, 
Ansari concludes with the argument that Iran’s nascent “culture of inclusivity has been 
replaced and even conservatives have found themselves overtaken by Iran’s ‘neo-
conservatives’.”165
 
Shahra Razavi provides further insight into the calls for reform (eslahat) being voiced by 
“true believers” in Iran, including lay intellectuals, clerical leaders and various feminists 
with Islamic convictions.  Razavi argues that these disparate currents of reformist thought 
represent a “genuinely local effort…to move Islamic politics out of the cul-de-sac of 
traditional Islam by endorsing modernist and universal values of human rights and 
democracy.”166  Concerns regarding gender equity are prominent in some aspects of this 
thinking, particularly in terms of feminist Islamism and “dynamic jurisprudence”.  Razavi 
recognizes that the reformist movement has been forced out of Iran’s centres of power, 
but suggests that this “challenges the reformist intellectuals and leaders to cultivate a 
broad social base, bringing into their fold the largely impoverished middle class, the 
women and the youth who constituted the ‘vote bank’ for President Khatami’s reformist 
platform, but whose voices remained muted in subsequent Iranian politics.”167  This 
would necessitate an effective reformist response to widespread concerns regarding 
unemployment, corruption, inadequate public services, high inflation, urban deterioration 
and human rights violations.  In Razavi’s opinion, this requires expanding the reformist 
agenda beyond its present liberal/neo-liberal parameters.  However, Razavi cautions that 
it “would be dangerous…to accept the argument that the average woman or man on the 
street does not need the kind of liberal rights that the reform movement…have been 
demanding.”168  Rather, she suggests that “disappointment with the reformists…does not 
stem from their championing of civil rights which are allegedly irrelevant for the popular 
social strata, but because they were largely incapable of substantiating those rights.”169  
 
Writing in 2006, after the election of President Ahmadinejad, Arshin Adib-Moghaddam 
examines the “pluralistic momentum” in Iran, which “challenges the state-centric 
approach to Iranian politics.”170  Abid-Moghaddam argues that the reform movement is a 
trajectory that “feeds into the political process in a bottom-up manner,” and helpfully 
explores the relationship between the reform movement and Iran’s “diverse” civil 
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society.171  He suggests that as long as pluralism remains a driving force in Iranian 
politics, the movement will continue to achieve political results. 
 
The international dimension: Iran-Iraq relations since 2003 
 
The complexity of Iran’s internal politics is rivalled only by the intricacies of its 
international relations.  Particularly in the early years of Khomeini’s rule, Iran’s 
international relations were shaped by the regime’s commitment to “exporting the 
revolution,” a proposition that met with marked resistance from both secular and 
religious leaders in the Middle East and further afield.  However, the notion of actively 
exporting the revolution has declined in popularity, although it is reportedly embraced by 
President Ahmadinejad.172  The literature underlines that Iran has constantly evolving, 
multifaceted, perceptively calculated relationships with its seven neighbours and the 
broader region.  David Menashri provides a helpful introduction to the dynamics 
animating Iran’s relationships with its neighbours in Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: 
Religion, Society and Power.173  Suzanne Maloney’s upcoming book on Iran’s 
relationship with the broader Muslim world also promises to be a significant primer for 
understanding Iran’s troubled involvement with Iraq.174
 
The English literature on the post-2003 Iran-Iraq relationship is limited, but growing.  
Some of the earlier research rested on mistaken assumptions about the strength and 
sustainability of the Iranian reform movement under Khatami, and the potential for rapid 
reconstruction and democratic development in Iraq.  This illustrates the difficulty of 
anticipating political trajectories in Iran and Iraq, particularly from outside the region.  At 
present most of the research on this issue seems to be carried out by western-based 
scholars and organizations.  Research and policy analysis organizations such as the 
International Crisis Group and Chatham House have taken the lead in releasing detailed 
reports on the influence of Iran in Iraq, with an increasing number of peer-reviewed 
politics journals carrying articles on the issue. 
 
The Iran-Iraq relationship: History and geopolitics 
 
Iran-Iraq relations have historically been “characterized by a near permanent state of 
rivalry and policy-military conflict”.175  Ehteshami challenges the popular notion that Iran 
and Iraq are “somehow destined to be rivals” due to ancient historical claims or 
ideological differences between Shi’as and Sunnis, and instead explains the tensions 
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between these neighbours in terms of realpolitik—territory, influence and survival.176  In 
contrast, Alani argues that the Iran-Iraq relationship is driven by a range of strategic 
factors in addition to religious and cultural interests, and suggests that historically the 
Iran-Iraq relationship was not merely a rivalry between two states, but a confrontation 
with significance for the wider Arab world: Iran, Iraq and Bahrain are the only countries 
in the world to have a Shi’a majority, but under the Sunni leadership of Saddam Hussien, 
Iraq counterbalanced Iran’s power and served to contain the influence of Shi’ism.  This 
was particularly important for Arab states with large Shi’a minorities, such as Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
Much of the literature traces Iran’s current interventionist policy towards Iraq back to 
Tehran’s post-revolutionary decision to extend both overt and covert support to Iraqi 
Shi’a groups, with a view to ousting the Ba’athist regime.  Although this policy was 
unsuccessful, political and ideological antagonism between Tehran and Baghdad, in 
combination with the Shatt al-Arab border dispute, led to the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War.  
Potter and Sick’s (2004) edited collection Iran, Iraq and the Legacies of War insightfully 
explores the history of the Iran-Iraq War, and addresses the key contemporary 
implications of the conflict.177
 
Ehteshami examines the limited state-level cooperation that began soon after the end of 
the Iran-Iraq war, including the revival of diplomatic ties, economic relations, and 
discussions on key issues including prisoners of war, reparations, and their shared border.  
However, Ehteshami maintains that Iran and Iraq continued to perceive one another as 
their greatest security threat and argues that at “both the theoretical and practical levels, 
Iran had been preparing, if only subconsciously, for another encounter with Iraq.”178  The 
prospect of such an encounter plummeted after the invasion of Iraq in March 2003.  
Although Alani suggests that “in the Gulf region and the wider Middle East, the balance 
of power between Iraq and Iran is the key the regional stability,” he stresses that post-
2003 there is no longer any question of a real balance of power between Tehran and 
Baghdad: Iraq no longer poses a serious military threat to Iran, and is unlikely to do so in 
the foreseeable future.  Indeed, a major 2006 Chatham House report by Rob Lowe and 
Claire Spencer entitled Iran, its Neighbours and the Regional Crises argues that by 
removing two rival regimes, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have considerably 
strengthened Iran’s hand so that “Iran views Iraq as its own backyard and has now 
superseded the US as the most influential power there,” and in the wider region.179  Lowe 
and Spencer assert that Iran has in fact been the chief beneficiary of the war on terror, and 
maintain that the signs of Iran’s increased power are most evident in Iraq.  
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Iranian foreign policy goals and activities in Iraq 
 
In its March 2005 report Iran in Iraq: How Much Influence?, the International Crisis 
Group points out that “Iran’s influence in Iraq has been one of the most talked about but 
least understood aspects of the post-war situation.”180  Arrays of accusations have been 
made against Iran, from unorganized meddling in Iraqi politics to carefully planned, 
nefarious interference.  In many cases, there is a lack of reliable evidence to support or 
refute these allegations. 
 
However, much of the literature emphasizes the importance of interpreting the Iran-Iraq 
relationship within the context of Iran’s political system and broader foreign policy 
traditions.  Multiple actors shape and implement Iranian foreign policy, and there is not 
always unity within the Iranian political and religious leadership on foreign policy, 
particularly in terms of Iraq.  Most commentators agree that despite Ahmadinejad’s 
confrontational, apocalyptic statements on international politics, the Supreme Leader 
retains control over most foreign policy issues, and espouses a comparatively restrained 
approach.  Indeed, various analysts argue that Ayatollah Khamenei is increasingly 
reasserting control over foreign policy in reaction to the extreme positions staked out by 
the president and his hardline advisers.  Lowe and Spencer argue that given Iran’s 
political, culture, economic and military power, most states in the region want to uphold 
positive or at least stable relations with Iran.  Nonetheless, when tensions in the region 
intensify, as a non-Arab, Shi’a state, Iran is often characterized by a collective sense of 
particularity and isolation that is some ways resembles Israel’s perception of being 
endangered and encircled by hostile neighbours.  They suggest that although 
Ahmadinejad has added a volatile element to Iranian foreign policy, Iran’s regional 
policy is essentially conservative.  Through the deft manipulation of its “soft power” 
resources, Iran generally strives to preserve the regional status quo.  Lowe and Spencer 
assert that Iran’s current core foreign policy concerns include maintaining Iran’s regional 
hegemony, (especially economic and cultural); extending Iran’s sphere of influence; 
increasing regional stability; and ensuring that Iraq remains unified, but unable to raise a 
military threat against Iran.181
 
Alani engages in a specific analysis of Iran’s goals in Iraq, pointing out that in 
anticipation of the US invasion, in August 2002 the Supreme Leader established a Special 
Committee on Iraq comprised of representatives of the state’s political, diplomatic, 
religious, defence and intelligence institutions.  The purpose of the committee was to 
monitor the conflict, articulate an Iranian strategy, and rally the state’s resources to 
advance Tehran’s interests in Iraq following the collapse of the Ba’athist regime.  
According to Alani (2006), the chief, inter-linked aims of the institutions on the 
committee were: (i) prevent a complete US success in Iraq that could threaten the 
immediate and long-term security and stability of Iran; (ii) ensure Iran’s sustained 
influence in post-Saddam Iraq, with a view to advancing Iran’s long-term interests in Iraq 
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and further afield; (iii) thwart the re-emergence of an Iraq that could challenge Iran’s 
hegemony in the region.182
 
While some analysts have suggested that Tehran’s goal is to establish an Islamic 
Republic in Iraq, most observers reject this interpretation of Iran’s intentions, as do 
Iranian officials.  Lowe and Spencer suggest that there is considerable flexibility in 
Tehran’s approach, although the “clear preference…is for a sympathetic Iraqi 
government, devoid of US support and military presence, overseeing a loosely federal 
structure, heavily penetrated by Iranian economic and political interests”.183  The 
International Crisis Group (ICG) concurs with this analysis, but emphasizes the 
importance for Tehran of preserving the territorial unity of Iraq, supporting a Shi’ite 
dominated government, and keeping the US “pre-occupied and at bay”.  The ICG argues 
that this has translated into a complex, three-part strategy that consists of: (i) encouraging 
democratic elections (which will solidify Shi’a political strength); (ii) promoting 
protracted but “managed chaos” to absorb the Americans’ focus and power in the region; 
and (iii) supporting a diverse array of often rival Iraqi actors to limit the risks borne by 
Iran in any potential outcome.184  The Chatham House and ICG reports detail the various 
activities Iran has undertaken in support of this strategy, including strengthening links 
with diverse Iraqi political actors and parties; assisting militias and insurgents through the 
Iranian intelligence organizations and the Revolutionary Guards; distributing religious 
propaganda; and aiding innumerable Islamic social welfare organizations. Lowe and 
Spencer suggest that by creating a diverse range of patronage networks and levers for its 
influence, Iran can easily generate instability and exploit the anarchy in Iraq, making Iraq 
a “first line of defence” in case of American aggression against Iran.185 The significance 
of Iran’s support for Iraqi NGOs does not appear to have been studied in detail, but 
various analysts highlight the importance of Iran’s ongoing support for political parties, 
particularly Shi’a groups.  Indeed, the December 2005 electoral victory of an alliance of 
parties with strong Iranian connections underscores how well-placed Iran is in post-
Saddam Iraqi politics.186
 
The Iranian policy towards Iraq has elicited a range of reactions.  Various western 
officials admit the policy is disquieting for the west, but represents an effective, flexible 
approach to protecting and advancing Tehran’s interests in a variety of different scenarios 
that may evolve in Iraq.  Ehteshami, on the other hand, characterizes Tehran’s approach 
as “short-sighted” and criticizes Tehran’s “singular failure to deliver a consistent set of 
policy options towards Baghdad.”187  He acknowledges, however, that after 2001, Iran’s 
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policy towards Iraq has become “increasingly nuanced” in light of the United States’ 
strategic decisions.  While the strategic nature of Iran’s position is clear, some observers 
suggest the policy also reflects a degree of complacency and arrogance, rooted in 
Ahmadinejad’s belief in divine providence and the inevitable downfall and departure of 
the Americans from the Middle East.  The International Crisis Group suggests that Iraqis 
continue to view Iran with suspicion and resentment, while Chatham House analysts 
maintain that Iraqis realize that “they are caught between the geopolitical wishes of two 
powers, both of which have to be satisfied”.188
 
The Iran-Iraq relationship and political Islam 
 
Iran’s approach to post-Saddam Iraq illustrates the centrality of political pragmatism in 
the development of Iranian foreign policy, but the Iran-Iraq relationship also has 
important implications in terms of political Islam.  As Nakash points out in his article 
“The Shi’ites and the Future of Iraq”, the “collapse of Saddam’s regime has given Shi’ite 
debates on the meaning of a just government in the Iraqi context a greater urgency.”189  
Indeed, the issue of the relationship and struggles between Iranian proponents of the 
velayat-e faqih and Iraqi Shi’ites who support the concept of constitutional democracy is 
of growing significance for scholars and policymakers alike. 
 
Nakash points out that historically, Shi’a Islam has been characterized by a tension 
between activism and quietism.  While the majority of Iran’s clergy have adopted 
Khomeini’s activist doctrine of the velayat-e faqih, many of Iraq’s leading Shi’a clerics 
embrace quietism, the belief that religion and politics, and religious and political 
authorities, should be clearly separate.190  During much of Saddam Hussein’s rule, links 
were severed between the shrine city of Najaf (Iraq) and Qom (Iran), the two main 
centres of Shi’a learning.  Saddam Hussein’s suppression of Shi’a learning effectively 
bolstered Qom’s position as the hub of Shi’a thought, and enabled Iranian clerics to assert 
the dominancy of the activist interpretation of Shi’ism.  Various Iraqi Shi’a scholars and 
political actors took refuge in Iran during the reign of the Ba’athist regime, and 
subscribed to Khomeini’s activist interpretations of Shi’ism.  However, upon their return 
to Iraq, many of these individuals and groups, most notably the SCIRI, have distanced 
themselves from the idea of establishing an Islamic state in Iraq based on the Iranian 
model.  Nakash argues that this parting of views is rooted as much in Iraqi nationalism as 
in theological conviction, although other commentators such as Lowe and Spencer 
maintain that Iraqi nationalism is defunct as a source of political motivation.  Nakash 
suggests the vast majority of Iraqi Shi’ites have probably already decided against 
mimicking the Iranian system, but recognizes that exchanges between Najaf and Qom 
may spark fresh thinking on political Islam in Iran. 
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Issues for future research 
 
There is clearly a wealth of literature on the experience of political Islam in Iran.  
Producing sound recommendations on areas for future research would require a thorough 
examination of the Farsi literature, as well as in-depth discussions with experts on Iran, 
particularly with researchers working in Iran.  Given the restrictive political climate in 
Iran at the moment, this is no simple proposition.  However, it is clear from the literature 
that understanding Iran’s encounters with political Islam is essential to appreciating the 
broader trajectory of political Islam in the Middle East.  Yet there is only a limited 
amount of recent literature that engages in rigorous comparative analysis of Islamism in 
Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East.  As Chehabi points out, “The post-revolutionary 
Iranian regime is in many ways a puzzle to the political scientist…Iran is the only 
example of a post-traditional theocracy, which means that a comparativist has literally no 
previously developed tools for analyzing the country’s political system.”191  However, 
Chehabi underlines the fruitfulness of comparative studies of Iranian politics, and it is 
likely that more focused comparative research could yield insightful results of clear 
interest to both scholars and political actors. 
 
Several scholars identify specific issues within the broad topic of political Islam and 
Iranian politics that merit future research.  For example, Vaez suggests that several 
questions have attracted relatively little scholarly attention, including “how and under 
what circumstances have domestic changes occurred during the past two decades under 
the rule of the Islamic state in Iran?  To what extent have the revolutionary political 
culture and the legacy of Khomeini…continued or changed?  When and how have 
domestic and international politics interacted in post-revolutionary Iran?”192  In terms of 
research on civil society and parastatal organizations, Saeidi underlines the need for more 
work on the influence of the bonyads on Iranian political and economic life.  However, 
he also emphasizes the difficulty of carrying out such research, as the bonyads are not 
obliged to disclose information about their financial and operational practices.193  Milani 
stresses that despite the unquestionable political importance of young Iranians, no solid 
studies have been published on this generation’s views and political activities.194  
Reflecting on the state of research on the Iranian women’s movement, Paidar suggests 
that more studies are required to understand the diverse and evolving views of Islamist 
feminists.195
 
Iranian scholar Farideh Farhi points out that many prominent interpretations of 
contemporary political events in Iran are not based on rigorous analysis.  For example, 
arguments about the significance of popular or grassroots reform movements do not 
always rest on detailed social science research.  Farhi also points out that the rise of 
political Islam in Iran has entailed an unprecedented invasion of Iranian citizens’ private 
                                                 
191 Chehabi 2001, p. 48. 
192 Vaez, H. (2004) “Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Continuity and Change”, British Journal of 
Middle Eastern Studies 31(2), p. 237. 
193 Saeidi 2002, pp. 487, 493. 
194 Milani 2005, p. 32. 




lives.  Farhi suggests that the impacts of this “invasion” merit much more research, 
focusing in particular on the ways in which the transformation of the public and the 
private has distorted the political process in Iran.196  The struggle over women’s place in 
the Islamic Republic is particularly salient in connection to debate on the transformation 
of the public and private spheres, and merits further examination. 
 
Looking towards research on Iran’s international role, the International Crisis Group 
points out that analyses of Iran’s influence in Iraq are rife with assumptions that could 
helpfully be substantiated or refuted with more rigorous research.197  Additional research 
on the development of debates between Iranian and Iraqi Shi’ites on the nature of just 
government would also benefit both scholars and policymakers concerned with this 
volatile region. 
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